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Abstract. Ad hoc networking is a new paradigm of wireless commu-
nications for mobile nodes. Mobile ad hoc networks work properly only
if the partecipating nodes cooperate to network protocols. Cooperative
algorithms make the system vulnerable to user misbehavior as well as
to malicious and selfish misbehavior. Nodes act selfishly to save battery
power, by not cooperating to routing-forwarding functions. Lack of co-
operation may severely degrade the performance of the ad hoc system.
This paper presents a new approach to cope with cooperation misbehav-
ior, focusing on the forwarding function. We present a general framework,
based on reliability indices taking into account not only selfish/malicious
misbehavior, but also situations of congestion and jammed links. We aim
at avoiding unreliable routes and enforcing cooperation, thus increasing
network “performability” (performance and reliability).
1 Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network is composed by a group of wireless nodes that co-
operatively form the network without the support of any fixed infrastructure.
All nodes are capable of movement and can be connected dynamically in an
arbitrary manner. Nodes of these networks function as routers which discover
and maintain routes to other nodes in the network. Essentially, the mobile ad
hoc networking technology enables an autonomous system of mobile nodes, and
introduces the notion of a spontaneous network [1], created when a group of
people come together for some collaborative activity. Such networks have been
proposed for several goals: data collection in sensor arrays, providing a communi-
cation mean in hostile environment (battlefield) or rescue operations, providing
connectivity to people attending conferences, meetings or lectures with their
laptops. Another emerging application of ad hoc networks concerns vehicular
networks, where intervehicle communications and vehicle to road communica-
tions are considered to have extensive potential for the development of efficient
safety systems installed in vehicles [2].
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The lack of centralized points leads to the necessity of distributing basic func-
tions like packet routing and forwarding to all available nodes in the network
that must cooperate, and provide services to each other. The lack of a fixed
infrastructure, and consequently of a centralized authority, leads adversaries to
exploit this vulnerability for new types of attacks designed to break the coopera-
tive paradigm. For example, routing mechanism is vulnerable in ad hoc networks
because each device acts as a router. Forwarding mechanism is cooperative as
well: communications between nodes more than 1-hop away are performed by
intermediate nodes that act as relays.
A node that does not cooperate is called a misbehaving node, and routing-
forwarding misbehavior can be caused by nodes that are broken, overloaded,
malicious or selfish [3]. A broken node is not able to cooperate because of a
software/hardware fault. An oveloaded node does not cooperate because it lacks
CPU cycles, buffer space, or network bandwidth. A malicious node does not co-
operate because it wants to intentionally damage network functioning by drop-
ping packets. A selfish node is unwilling to spend battery life, CPU cycles, or
available network bandwidth to forward packets not of direct interest to it, even
though it expects others to forward packets on its behalf. It uses the network but
does not cooperate, saving battery life for its own communications: it does not
intend to directly damage other nodes. While the first two cases (broken and
overloaded) define misbehavior due to uncontrollable events, in case of a ma-
licious or selfish node, cooperation misbehavior is motivated by an intentional
action of the node, even if with different aim: malicious or not. In any case, a
cooperation misbehavior can have severe effects on the network functioning. Co-
operation misbehavior due to an intentional action is a new problem that arises
in the context of ad hoc networks, so new mechanisms are needed to face the
problem of service availability.
Cooperation among nodes has been previously addressed in [4], [5], [6]. The
starting step is given in [4]. They present a solution aimed at detecting and
avoiding misbehaving nodes through a mechanism based on a watchdog and a
reputation system. The watchdog identifies misbehaving nodes by performing
a neighborhood monitoring: it observes the behavior of neighbors by promis-
cuously listening to communications of nodes in the same transmission range.
According to collected information, the reputation system maintains a value for
each observed node that represents a reputation of its behavior. The reputa-
tion mechanism allows to avoid sending packets through misbehaving nodes. In
this way, malicious nodes are rewarded and strengthened, while cooperation en-
forcing is totally absent. The following works, CONFIDANT [5] and CORE [6],
extend such a scheme with a punishment mechanism that isolates misbehaving
nodes by not serving their requests. When a neighbor’s reputation falls down a
predefined threshold, service provision to the misbehaving node is interrupted.
In such a way, there is no advantage for a node to misbehave because any re-
source utilization will be forbidden. These solutions present some limitations.
First, the watchdog’s weaknesses are not negligible: in presence of collisions, dis-
homogeneous transmission ranges, or directional antennas, the watchdog is not
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able to properly monitoring the neighborhood, and misbehaving nodes detection
can fail. Another important aspect that must be considered is the employing of
cooperation in security mechanisms. This approach may have severe drawbacks
in term of traffic overhead and wrong accusation spreading. The CONFIDANT
protocol generates some additional traffic for reputation propagation. The pro-
duced overhead may result heavy, and malicious nodes may perform a new attack
by sending false alarms about other nodes. Furthermore, it is worth noticing that
both CONFIDANT and CORE do not take into account the network utilization:
by totally avoiding all routes containing misbehaving nodes, they risk deviating
all the traffic on well behaving nodes, with the result of overloading them and
links between them. Finally, both mechanisms work as extensions to the Dy-
namic Source Routing (DSR) [7] protocol. This can be a big constraint as there
is not yet a standard routing protocol for ad hoc networks [8].
2 Estimating Routes Reliability
We address forwarding misbehavior due to intentional actions, malicious or self-
ish, as well as uncontrollable events, such as congestion or jammed links. The
basic idea is to control nodes’ in/out traffic to optimize network utilization, and
enforce cooperation. The system is based on the principle that we can trust only
ourselves and we cannot solve the cooperation misbehavior problem by using co-
operation. So, the proposed mechanism is distributed, but not cooperative, and
based on nodes internal knowledge. Every node acts independently, without shar-
ing any information with other nodes, and trusts only information coming from
the other communication peer (communication between peers can be encrypted
to avoid forged acknowledgements by intermediate malicious nodes). According
to our approach a node is responsible not only for forwarding a packet, but it
shall forward it on the route that maximizes its success probability.
The framework we define is based on reliability indices. Every node has a
dynamically updated reliability table containing a value for every outgoing link
to a neighbor. Such a value represents a reliability index for paths rooted at
that neighbor. Every time the node sends a packet on a path, it updates the
reliability value associated to the neighbor through which the packet has passed:
the updating is positive whenever source node receives an acknowledgement
from destination, negative otherwise. The reliability value is unique for all paths
rooted on that neighbor (see Fig. 1(a)). If source node observes that the reliability
index of that subtree decreases, then it should immediately reduce the traffic sent
through that neighbor, by preferring routes passing through a neighbor with a
higher reliability index. Figure 1(b) shows an example: source node S has three
possible routes to send a packet to destination node D. Each route passes through
a different neighbor (I, J, K), and each link to a neighbor has a reliability index1.
By comparing such values, source S finds out that path through K is the better
1 Node S does not have the knowledge of the reliability of all the links, but it has a
reliability index for each subtree rooted on its neighbors. This index summarizes the
reliability of all the links crossed by the S-D path.
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ated to its neighbors (route through
K seems the most reliable)
Fig. 1. Reliability index
one, even if the longer in terms of hops number. Source S may decide to take that
path to maxime the success probability of the packet forwarding. This procedure
of choosing the best next hop can be executed by each intermediate node between
source and destination, if the routing protocol adopted does not provide that the
packet shall follow a predefined route (i.e., DSR protocol specifies the whole route
a packet has to follow to reach destination, so intermediate nodes cannot choose
the next hop to which forward packets). The only difference between source
node and intermediate nodes is the possibility to update reliability values. While
source node expects an acknowledgement from destination, intermediate nodes
do not have any way to understand if the packet has reached destination. Thus,
intermediate nodes can use reliability values (calculated when sending their own
traffic) to take decisions about available routes, but they cannot modify them,
because in such a case they do not get any acknowledgement back.
The reliability index associated to each neighbor reflects the behavior of all
paths passing through it. In this way, we do not point to single misbehaving
nodes, but to zones (potentially) containing one or more of them. In reality,
when communication between nodes increases (most of nodes communicate with
each other), there is a strong relation between a reliability value and the node
pointed out by it: closer is the misbehaving node, lower is the reliability value in
its direction. Figure 2 shows an example. M is a selfish node dropping packets
with probability p. At first all reliability values are initialized to 1. Node S starts
sending packets to Node D through K. On such a route there is a selfish node
(M) that drops some packets. Thus, every time Node M drops a packet, Node
S updates J’s reliability that decreases, for example, to value 0.72 (Fig. 2(a)).
Than Node S starts sending all packets on the other available route (through
neighbor K) that keeps a good reliability value. When communication between
nodes increases (e.g., Node S starts communicating with Y, J with T, and S with
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decreases because M’s behavior af-
fects it. Thus S starts deviating its
traffic through J.
S D
0.9
0.81 J
YI
0.9 1
1
1
1
M T1 1
OK N
0.58
(b) At full capacity, J’s reliability
increases because of communication
from S to Y, while reliability on
link (J,M) continues decreasing ev-
ery time M drops a packet sent by
J to T or D.
Fig. 2. Relation between node’s behavior and reliability calculated by its neighbors.
D), J’s reliability calculated by S increases, thanks to successful communication
between S and Y, while M’s reliability calculated by J decreases deeply, because
of the selfish node M (Fig. 2(b)). This example highlights how reliabilities of
all nodes sending packets on a path with a selfish node are affected by that
misbehavior. Closer is the misbehaving node, lower is the reliability calculated
in that direction.
To enforce cooperation we propose an approach analogous to the outgoing
traffic control. The basic idea is to accept an incoming packet according to the
reliability associated with the incoming link: if the value is low, then the receiving
node may neglet the packet. This reciprocal approach to in/out traffic allows to
use links in a way that agrees with their functioning level. A link that has a
low reliability value is used to send messages with a frequency proportional to
its reliability value, as well as messages received from that link are accepted
according to that value. The correspondence between the reliability index and
the accepting level of incoming traffic must still be defined.
The formula used to choose a route, in case of multiple available choices, takes
into account the network utilization problem: besides looking at the probability
value, the formula considers also traffic balance.
Every node builds its own reliability table by only referring to its internal
actions, without any cooperation with other nodes. In this manner, there is no
way for a malicious node to deceive other nodes because there is no informa-
tion exchange. This absence of cooperation in the security mechanism has two
important advantages. First, the system is resistant to attacks performed using
the security mechanism itself: it is impossible for a node to maliciously decrease
another node’s probability. Second, there is an advantage in terms of traffic
overhead, because no additional traffic is generated.
Another advantage of the proposed scheme is the overcoming of watchdog’s
weaknesses: probabilities are calculated by means of local traffic observations
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instead of neighborhood monitoring. Furthermore, the mechanism is flexible be-
cause it is independent on the routing protocol adopted.
3 The Proposed Scheme
3.1 Model and Assumptions
We model a network as a graph G = (V, L), where V is a set of mobile nodes
and L is a set of direct links. Each node i ∈ V has a unique node identifier (ID).
A link (i, j) ∈ L represents a connection between the two nodes i and j, meaning
that j is in the transmitting range of i, and viceversa. In that case, nodes i, j are
said adjacent (or neighbors), and we call N(i), neighbor set of i, the set of nodes
adjacent to a given node i:
N(i) = {j|j ∈ V ∧ (i, j) ∈ L}
In this model we assume the following:
1. links allow two-way communication (bidirectional links), so that connected
nodes can communicate with each other in either direction;
2. an end-to-end acknoledgement notifies packets delivery between peer nodes2;
3. we know multiple routes to a destination, and for each route the source node
knows the next hop to reach destination.
Regarding to hypothesis 3, it can be easily satisfied in a sensor network where
each node has view of the network topology that is static. In a mobile ad hoc
network, a slight modification of one of the existing routing protocols may allow
the executing node to store the different routes it identified.
Given any node i ∈ V, for each j ∈ N(i) we have a probability value Rj that
represents the reliability level of link (i, j). Probability Rj is dinamically up-
dated every time node i sends a packet on link (i, j) and represents a reliability
measure for paths rooted at neighbor j: it increases if the sent packet reaches
the destination, it decreases otherwise. We suppose to have an end-to-end noti-
fication acknowledgement on packet delivery: if node s is the source node, node
d the destination, with an arbitrary number n of hops between s and d (n > 0),
when destination node d receives the packet, it sends back to s an ack message.
If s does not receive any acknowledgement before a specified timeout, then we
assume the packet did not reach destination, and some node on the path did
not forward it. For each packet sent, we denote with M the result of the packet
delivery and we estimate a smoothed reliability value Rj using a low-pass fil-
ter, with the same approach used in the TCP protocol for Round-Trip Time
measurement [9]:
Rj ← αRj + (1 − α)M (1)
2 Communication between source and destination nodes can be encrypted to avoid
forged acknowledgements
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where α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is a smoothing factor and represents the percentage of
the previous estimate considered on each new estimate. If α = 0.9, then ninety
percent of the new estimate is from the previous estimate, and 10% is from the
new measurement.
M is the result of a packet delivery process from s to d, and it can assume
the following values:
M =
{
0 if s does not receive ack from d
1 if s receives ack from d
If packet does not reach destination, then the reliabilty on outgoing link of
source node decreases by a α factor. If packet reaches destination then nodes are
cooperating and reliability on outgoing link of source node is smoothed by a α
factor and increased by (1 − α).
In the following, we show how reliability indices are used to control outgoing
and incoming traffic, achieving reliable forwarding and enforcing cooperation.
3.2 Outgoing Traffic Control
In case of multiple routes available for packet forwarding to a destination node,
source node can choose one of them according to a certain principle. Routing
protocols for ad hoc networks usually choose the shorter one, in terms of hops
number, or the fresher one in terms of discovering time. Such criteria do not take
into account links reliability. Hereafter, we propose two route selection policies
dealing with reliability values associated to outgoing links, and we investigate
their effectiveness.
Policy-1. Source node takes always the most reliable route. In such a case,
source node compares reliability values for available routes and forwards
packets on the link with the greatest value. This policy assures source node
of taking always the most reliable route. The main drawback of such a choice
is the deviation of all traffic on most reliable links which, in case of high traffic
load, can quickly get congested.
Policy-2. This policy relates reliability values of available routes to build a
probabilistic scheme. Let us suppose we have several possible routes to a
destination through different source’s neighbor nodes, i1, i2,..., in. Each
neighbor has its respective reliability value Ri1 , Ri2 ,...,Rin . We associate
a probabilistic value to each of such neighbors, pij , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, defined in the
following way:
pij =
Rij∑n
k=1 Rik
(2)
where
∑n
j=1 pij = 1. Equation (2) relates reliability values so that the re-
sulting probabilistic value reflects the link reliability level. Routes are cho-
sen according to the probabilistic value associated to the first node on the
path: the greater the probability, the higher the route selection frequency.
This probabilistic policy allows nodes to take even less reliable routes: traffic
forwarding function is better distributed on all available routes and links
congestion becomes rarer.
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3.3 Incoming Traffic Control
Reliability indices can be used also to enforce cooperation. The basic idea is
to reverse the service we obtain from each neighbor. For example, an incoming
packet is accepted according to the reliability index associated to the incoming
link. Thus we can define the probability to accept a packet from a neighbor I as:
P{accept from I} = Ri (3)
If a node accepts an incoming packet according to such a probability, then the
sender will see its packets accepted in a way that agrees with its reliability level.
In fact, as we said in section 2, there is a strong relation between a reliability
value and the behavior of the node pointed out by such a value. If a node has a
very low reliability value for a neighbor, it is quite likely that the pointed node
is misbehaving. This mechanism stimulates nodes cooperation: a good reliability
value will allow them to see their traffic forwarded through the network.
The example above represents a first possible approach coping with coopera-
tion enforcing. Further work will investigate an efficient utilization of reliability
indices. In particular, we aim at finding out refined policies able to control in-
coming traffic, without penalizing too much sender nodes.
So far we considered only forwarding misbehavior as it is the topic we address
in this paper. Let us see what happens in case of a routing misbehavior, caused
by a malicious or a selfish node. A typical example for the former case is the Black
Hole attack [10]. A node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the
shorter path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept. Once it has created
the forged route, it can drop packets passing by it. As the malicious node drops
packets, destination node will never receive such packets. Consequently, source
node will not receive any acknoledgement from destination, and will decrease
reliability in that direction. In the future, the outgoing traffic will avoid it and
packets incoming from that zone will be refused with a high probability. On
the other hand, in case of a selfish disruption of the routing protocol, the node
does not partecipate to the routing function to save energy. In this situation,
the selfish node will not appear in any route. This will not affect our system,
that will continue working correctly, but it will not be able to detect the routing
misbehavior. We intend to approach routing misbehavior in the future work.
4 Evaluation
The objective of this evaluation is to test the effectiveness of the reliability for-
mula, given by (1), and of the policies for route selection, defined in Section 3.2.
Specifically, we want to check if the defined reliability correctly reflects links
behavior. In addition we want to investigate the throughput achieved by the
different policies.
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Fig. 3. Test of reliability formula
4.1 Simulation Setup
To test the reliability formula we simulated a double path between two source
and destination nodes (see Figure 3(a)). On the first path, Node 1 is coopera-
tive while, on the second path, there is a selfish node discarding packets with
probability p = 0.5. Every time the node sends a packet on one of two paths, it
updates the reliability value associated to the neighbor through which the packet
was forwarded3. Figure 3(b) shows the reliability function for both neighbors.
Both reliability values, R1 and R2 are inizialized to 1. On Link 1 reliability keeps
constant the value 1 because node on that path never discards packets. On Link
2 reliability decreases every time a packet is dropped (a cross on the plotting
indicates a packet dropping on Link 2), assuming a mean value of 0.5.
To evaluate network performance for the forwarding policies we considered
a similar context (see Figure 4). Source node S and destination node D are
more than one hop away (we denote intermediate nodes between source and
destination as zone). Let us call Node 1 and Node 2, the neighbors of source
node respectively on Route 1 and Route 2. We associate a reliability value R1 to
link towards Node 1 and, R2 to link towards Node 2. We also suppose that all
nodes in Zone 1 are cooperative, while in Zone 2 there is a selfish node discarding
packets with a probability p.
We investigated throughput for different route-selection policies, by varying
the traffic loads and the transmission speeds. We defined four different scenarios
and conducted experiments applying the different policies to such scenarios.
Scenario 1. All links have the same transmission speed (1 Mbit). Nodes on
zone 1 are all cooperative, so that there is no packets dropping on Route
1, while there is a selfish node in zone 2, that provokes packets’ losses with
probability p = 0.5.
3 For the sake of semplicity, simulations implement immediate acknowledgments of
delivered packets and no loss of ACKs. This choise does not affect the meaning of
obtained results and effects of ACK delay on reliability estimates will be studied in
further work.
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Scenario 2. We inserted in zone 1 a node with an outgoing link with trans-
mission speed of 0.75 Mbit. Node N has a buffer capacity of 10 packets.
Consequently, N can get congested, and drops packets arriving while the
buffer is full.
Scenario 3. We considered the same parameters of the second scenario, by
increasing buffer capacity to 100 for Node N .
Scenario 4. We increase the transmission speed of sender link to 2 Mbit, keep-
ing the other parameters the same as Scenario 3.
4.2 Simulation Results
Experiments have been performed in each scenario previously defined, by apply-
ing the different route selection policies. We simulated also the conventional case
in which the forwarding node does not consider reliability values, and distribute
packets equally on both routes. Choosing both routes with the same probability
represents the best compromise when no selection criterion is used, because it
minimizes congestion events. In such a case the forwarding node would proba-
bly choose always the same route (e.g., the shorter one), by overloading nodes
on that route. In the following, we call such a criterion of traffic distribution
load-balancing, to indicate that reliability values are not considered, but traffic
is equally spread on both routes.
We evaluated the model with the same traffic load. We observed the reliability
function and network throughput in time4. In particular, we studied situations
of congestion. In experiments concerning Scenario 2 and 3, Zone 1 contains a
node that may get congested in case of high traffic load, as it has limited buffer
capacity and link speed passes from 1 Mbit (incoming link) to 0.75 Mbit (out-
going link). Figures 5 and 7 show the reliability function obtained by applying
policy-1 and policy-2 to scenario 2 (Figures 5(a) and 7(a)) and to scenario 3
(Figures 5(b) and 7(b)).
4 Time is always measured in seconds.
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Fig. 5. Reliability function for link 1 and link 2, by applying policy-1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 0  500  1000  1500  2000
Tr
af
fic
 lo
ad
Time
Route 1
Route 2
(a) Scenario 2
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 0  500  1000  1500  2000
Tr
af
fic
 lo
ad
Time
Route 1
Route 2
(b) Scenario 3
Fig. 6. Traffic sent on both routes by policy-1
When we apply policy-1, we choose always the most reliable route. Figure 5(a)
shows the reliability function for Scenario 2. As reliability R2 on Link 2 descreases
because of the selfish node in Zone 2, source node S starts forwarding packets
always on Route 1 (Fig. 6(a)), as soon as R2 slopes down the value 0.81. In fact,
R1 is always greater than such a value. On Link 1 reliability decreases whenever
Node N get congested. Such events are very frequent because Node N cannot
buffer more that 10 packets. By increasing the buffer capacity (figure 5(b)),
congestion events become rarer. This phenomenon is due to burstiness in the
traffic. A longer buffer space allows to absorb temporary overload conditions.
Alike the previous case, all traffic is sent on Route 1 as soon as R2 slopes down
the value 0.81 (Fig. 6(b)).
While applying policy-2, packets are distributed on both links, even if most
of traffic is sent on Route 1 (Fig. 8(a)). In fact, when reliability value for Link
2 decreases greatly, probability to choose Route 1 increases, leading to some
packets dropping due to congestion. Figure 7(a) shows that when the reliability
value on Link 2 drops, the consequent deviation of most of traffic on Route 1
causes several events of congestion. Again, increasing buffer capacity for Node
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Fig. 7. Reliability function for link 1 and link 2, by applying policy-2
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Fig. 8. Traffic sent on both routes by policy-2
Table 1. Throughput comparison
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Load-balancing 0.77 0.76 0.77 1.16
Policy-1 1.00 0.66 0.66 0.66
Policy-2 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.98
N, congestion becomes rarer (Figure 7(b)). Traffic sent on both routes is shown
in Figure 8(b).
We want now to investigate the efficiency of policies previously defined by
comparing their throughputs. Table 1 compares policies based on reliability
(policy-1 and -2) with the load-balancing case, and shows the throughputs ob-
served in each scenario. It is quite obvious that in Scenario 1 policies based on
reliability values prevail over load-balancing. In fact, as Zone 1 never fails in
forwarding packets, Route 1 is always chosen in case of policy-1, and very often
chosen when policy-2 is applied.
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Table 2. Throughput comparison with selfish nodes both in Zone 1 and 2
Scenario 1
Load-balancing 0.67
Policy-1 0.81
Policy-2 0.70
If we insert a bottleneck in Zone 1, due to a slower link and/or to a node with
a smaller receiving capacity (or processing power), then in case of high traffic
load, Zone 1 can get congested, and drops packets. In such cases (Scenario 2 and
3), policy-1 is not very successful as it deviates all the traffic on Route 1, by
causing frequent congestion events. Policy-2 appears better as it allows a more
balanced traffic distribution on both routes, selecting more frequently the most
reliable one.
Both reliability-based policies increase network throughput: policy-1 is better
in case of no congestion, there policy-2 is more successful. This is not true if Zone
1 becomes completely congested (see Scenario 4). In such a situation, the load-
balancing solution seems the better one, even if policy-2 is still very efficient.
The reason is the deviation of most of traffic on Route 1 that continuously get
congested and thus drops packets, while the load-balancing solution avoids any
congestion events by equally distributing traffic on both routes.
Finally, we observed the throughput in case of selfishness in both zones.
We considered a model analogous to that one shown in Figure 4, where both
zones have a selfish node, with different level of selfishness: probability to discard
packets is 0.2 in Zone 1 and 0.5 in Zone 2. Even in this situation reliability-based
policies improve network performance in packet forwarding. Values reported in
Table 2 show the efficiency of such policies, highlighting again the success of
policy-1 in case of no congestion.
5 Policy Refinement
Results obtained by applying our policies to scenario 4 led us to a new possible
route-selection policy, based on congestion control. In fact, in case of high traffic
load and frequent congestion, reliability-based policies become ineffective. Policy-
1 especially aims at choosing always the most reliable route, without taking
into account the amount of traffic sent on it. To improve network performance,
the forwarding node should stop sending packets on a route that is becoming
overloaded, even if it has the bigger reliability value. Thus a good policy would
be:
Choose the most reliable link until it does not get congested.
We repeated Scenario 4 experiments, inserting such a restriction on packet for-
warding. For the sake of semplicity, we simulated the ability to understand if
a node has reached the maximum of its receiving capacity by checking the oc-
cupancy of its buffer before sending a packet to it. Results obtained through
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Table 3. Throughput comparison for congestion-control based policies.
Scenario 4
Load-balancing 1.14
Policy-1 1.19
Policy-2 1.16
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Fig. 9. Round Trip Time
such a simulation are shown in Table 3. Both policy-1 and policy-2 are better
than load-balancing and improve network throughput in comparison with results
obtained without taking congestion into account.
In reality, the simulated method is not applicable because a node cannot know
other nodes’ capacity. Instead, it is possible to understand if a zone on a path is
becoming congested by observing the Round Trip Time (RTT). A RTT increase
indicates a possible congestion condition. In fact, if we relate forwarding failures
and RTT values measured in the experiment performed for policy-2 in Scenario
4, we note that, on Route 1, nodes start dropping packets when RTT reaches
value 68 (see fig. 9(a)). After that value we have frequent packets dropping due
to the high level of congestion. On the other route, there is no relation between
RTT and packets dropping, as it is caused by a selfish node. Figure 9(b) shows
how packets dropping on Route 2 happens even if RTT value keeps very low.
We intend to face in a further study the identification of congestion conditions
by observing the RTT value, its derivative and variation.
This led us to observe that the reliability index provides a good link charac-
terization for selfish nodes that discard packets intentionally. On the other hand,
to better cope with congestion situations, reliability can be characterized by a
two states index R, to distinguish between congestion events and intentional
misbehavior. We will address this new kind of reliability index in the future
work.
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